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The General Utilities doctrine was once described as one of the
seven fundamental principles of our corporate tax system.' Always
controversial, it was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Its repeal
was one of numerous tax law changes-made during the merger mania
of the 1980s-designed to limit the role of the tax system in promoting
what was perceived to be a dangerously high level of takeover activity.
Prominent tax scholars have long criticized the General Utilities
doctrine, and its repeal was generally hailed as sound tax policy. None-
theless, some scholars have questioned whether General Utilities' repeal
was wise. The more sophisticated analyses compare the various tax
non-neutralities created by the doctrine with the tax non-neutralities
created by its repeal.2 But even this handful of thoughtful scholars pays
little attention to the existence of non-tax non-neutralities-namely,
those arising from the separation of management and shareholders in
a corporation-that may justify the introduction of tax non-neutrali-
ties.3 This Article attempts to bridge the discontinuity between the tax
literature and the finance literature on takeovers by developing a
broader framework that incorporates both.
* Attorney-Advisor, Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of Treasury. BAL, 1980,
Princeton University; J.D., 1984, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M., 1991, New York
University School of Law. The opinions expressed in the Article are solely those of the author
and do not reflect the views of the Department of Treasury. This Article was written while the
author was an Associate Professor at Cornell Law School. I am grateful to David Dana, Mary
Louise Fellows, Robert Green, Michael Klausner, Russell Osgood, Linda Sugin, Peter Wiedenbeck
and the participants in the Georgetown Tax Policy Workshop for their helpful comments. I also
thank Richard McKilligan and Genji Shiga for their research assistance.
I Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution
and Reform, 87 YALE LJ. 90, 96, 130 (1977).
2 See Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform Rules,
44 TAx L. Rxv. 145 (1989); Paul B. Stephan III, Disaggregation and Subchapter C: Rethinking
Corporate Tax Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 655 (1990); Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986: A State ofDisequilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REv. 839 (1988).
3 Professor James Repetti has argued that corporate tax policy analysis ought to take into
account non-tax non-neutralities arising from the separation of management and shareholders
in a corporation. SeeJames R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing
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This Article examines the finance literature exploring the causes
and consequences of takeovers and concludes that the policies under-
lying General Utilities' repeal were misguided. This Article finds that
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine has made inefficient acquisitions
more attractive while making efficient ones less attractive. Further-
more, repeal of the General Utilities doctrine has reduced the attrac-
tiveness of the most efficient means by which managers can divest
themselves of the product of their past acquisitiveness. This Article
concludes that certain aspects of the doctrine should be reinstated.
I. THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE AND ITS REPEAL
Named after the 1935 case General Utilities & Operating Co. v.
Helvering,4 the General Utilities doctrine appeared to begin as a straight-
forward exception to our classical system of corporate taxation, under
which two levels of tax-corporate and shareholder-are imposed on
a corporation's income. The doctrine permitted a corporation to dis-
tribute appreciated assets to its shareholders without recognizing gain.
(In contrast, a corporation that sold, rather than distributed, appreci-
ated assets, recognized gain.) As codified by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the doctrine excused the corporate level tax on all
distributions of property by a corporation to its shareholders, whether
the distribution took the form of a dividend, redemption or liquidating
distribution.5
The simplicity of the General Utilities doctrine, however, was de-
ceptive. The doctrine created tensions and tax planning incentives that
the courts and Congress struggled with for fifty years.6 The tensions
were finally resolved when the doctrine was completely repealed in
1986.7 In the years since then, General Utilities' repeal has come to stand
for the broad proposition that a corporation ought to incur the cor-
Factors in Tax Poliy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 971 (1992);James R. Repetti, Management
Incentives, Needless Tax Complexity, and Capital Gains, 75 TAX NOTS 981 (1997). This Article
adopts an approach similar to Professor Repetti's.
4296 U.S. 200 (1935).
5 I.R.C. §§ 311, 337 (1954).
6 For a detailed history of the General Utilities doctrine and its erosion, see Bomas 1. BITrKR
&JAmEs S. EusTicE, FEDERAL INcomE TAxATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.20-
.22 at 7-45 to 7-60, 11.45-.46 at 11-53 to 11-66 (5th ed. 1987). See also Cheryl D. Block,
Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HAgv.J. ON LEGis. 307, 310-24 (1984);
David Shores, Repeal of General Utilities and the Triple Taxation of Corporate Income, 46 TAX LAW.
177,177-80 (1992); Eric S. Shube, Corporate Income orLoss onDistributions of Property: An Analysis
of General Utilities, 12J. CORP. TAx'N 3, 4-37 (1985); David Scott Sloan &John M. Loalbo, The
Ultimate Disposition of General Utilities: Analysis of the General Utilities Doctrine from Inception to
Repeal 6 B.U.J. TAx LAW 177 (1988).
7 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269 (1986).
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porate level tax if it divests appreciated property, whether by selling it,
distributing it or otherwise relinquishing ownership of it.
This Part will describe the tensions created by the doctrine and
the ways in which these tensions shaped the doctrine. It will then
summarize the policies underlying the demise of the doctrine and
describe the world of General Utilities' repeal as it now exists.
A. Tensions Created by the Doctrine
1. Disguised Sales of Appreciated Property
The General Utilities doctrine created an incentive for corporations
to disguise sales of appreciated property as distributions. If a corpora-
tion sold appreciated property and distributed the sale proceeds to its
shareholders, it would recognize gain on the sale. If, however, the
corporation instead distributed the property to its shareholders and let
the shareholders sell the property themselves, it would recognize no
gain under the doctrine, despite the fact that this achieved the identi-
cal economic result. This strategy succeeded in United States v. Cumber-
land Pub. Serv. Co.8 Yet, in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,9 the
government prevailed in its argument that a corporate liquidation
followed by a shareholder asset sale was, in reality, a corporate asset
sale followed by liquidation, thereby resulting in corporate gain recog-
nition.
In 1954, Congress codified the result of Cumberland by extending
nonrecognition treatment to a corporation selling its assets, provided
that the sale proceeds were distributed to shareholders in complete
liquidation of the selling corporation.' 0 In this way, Congress broad-
ened the scope of the General Utilities doctrine to provide nonrecogni-
tion for liquidating sales, as well as distributions, of appreciated prop-
erty.
Several years later, a similarly disguised sale strategy arose in the
non-liquidation context. A corporation wishing to divest an appreciated
asset could avoid the corporate level tax by first having the prospective
purchaser acquire shares in the selling corporation. The corporation
could then distribute the targeted asset to its new shareholder in
redemption of the newly acquired shares. The most well-known of
8 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (corporate liquidation followed by shareholder asset sale held tax-free
to liquidating corporation).
9 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
10 See I.R.C. § 337 (1954) (no gain or loss recognized by corporation upon sale or exchange
of assets, provided sale or exchange is pursuant to a plan of liquidation completed within 12
months).
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these transactions involved Mobil's acquisition of a subsidiary of Es-
mark. Mobil purchased fifty-four percent of the stock of Esmark in a
tender offer. Mobil then immediately redeemed its newly acquired
Esmark stock for all of the stock of Vickers, an appreciated oil and gas
subsidiary of Esmark. At the time the transaction took place, the
corporate level tax was excused." Therefore, Esmark reported no gain
on the distribution of Vickers to Mobil. The government unsuccessfully
challenged Esmark's position, arguing that the transaction was, in fact,
a cash sale by Esmark of Vickers to Mobil followed by the distribu-
tion of sale proceeds to Esmark shareholders in redemption of their
shares.'
2
As it had done for liquidating asset sales by codifying Cumberland
in 1954, Congress could have again broadened the scope of the General
Utilities doctrine by extending nonrecognition treatment to non-liqui-
datingsales of appreciated assets, provided the sale proceeds were then
distributed to shareholders. Congress, however, declined to do this and
instead narrowed the scope of the doctrine by requiring corporations
to recognize gain upon non-liquidating distributions of appreciated
assets. 3 This resulted in a somewhat schizophrenic state of affairs in
which both liquidating distributions and sales were tax-free, whereas
non-liquidating distributions and sales were both taxable. The treat-
ment of liquidating and non-liquidating distributions was harmonized
in 1986 by the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in its entirety,
pursuant to which liquidating distributions were also made taxable.
2. Section 338
Just as the General Utilities doctrine exerted pressure on the dis-
tinction between sales and distributions of appreciated property, it also
exerted pressure on the distinction between stock and asset purchases.
1 See I.R.C. § 311 (d) (2) (B) (1969).
12 See Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), affdper curiam, 886 E2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1989). The government lost the case, but in the meantime Congress acted to cut off this
perceived abuse of the General Utilities doctrine. SeeI.R.C. § 311 (d) (2) (C) (1982) (imposing new
restriction on tax-free distribution of subsidiary). See generally BoRs I. BTTR & JANIEs S.
EusTicE, FFnDEsA Icomm TAXATiON OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 7.21 at 7-50 to
7-59, 9.64 at 9-77 to 9-81 (4th ed. 1979) (describing 1969 version of 311(d)); Lawrence M.
Axelrod, Esmark's Tax-Free Disposition of a Subsidiary: Too Good to Be True?, 9J. CORP. TAx'N 232
(1982) (describing potential government challenges); Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate
Acquisitions, 38 TAx L. Rxv. 177, 218-23 (1983) (describing transaction and government posi-
tion); Lee A. Sheppard, Esmark v. Commissioner: Of Form and Substance and Aesthetics, 38 TAx
NoTS 1165 (1988) (describing Mobil-Esmark transaction).
13 See I.R.C. § 311(d) (2) (C) (1982) (imposing new restriction on tax-free distribution of
subsidiary).
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A corporation that purchased the stock of a target corporation and
then liquidated the target arguably could be viewed as having pur-
chased the target assets directly (while the target could then be
deemed to have liquidated and distributed the sale proceeds to its
shareholders). Whether the transaction was treated as a stock acquisi-
tion followed by an independent liquidation of the target, or rechar-
acterized as a deemed acquisition of the target assets, the tax conse-
quences to the selling target shareholders and to the target
corporation would have been the same: gain recognition for the share-
holders with respect to their shares and nonrecognition to the target
corporation with respect to its assets. 14 The consequences to the acquir-
ing corporation, however, would differ. If the transaction were re-
spected as a stock acquisition and an independent, subsequent liqui-
dation of the target, the acquiring corporation would take the historic
basis in the target assets.'- If instead the transaction were recharacter-
ized as a deemed acquisition of the target assets, the acquiring corpo-
ration would take a cost basis in the target assets.
Faced with choosing between these alternate characterizations,
the Tax Court in Kimball-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner16 found
taxpayer intent to be the determinative factor. This, in effect, gave an
acquirer the ability to step up17 to fair market value basis in a target
corporation's assets without paying any corporate tax on the apprecia-
tion. In 1954, Congress codified an objective version of the Kimball-
Diamond rule, under which a corporation acquiring target stock could
elect a tax-free step-up in the target assets by liquidating the target
within twelve months of the acquisition. Section 338, enacted in 1982,
was the successor of this election. It permitted the purchaser of a target
14 If the transaction were treated by the target shareholders as a sale of their stock followed
by the liquidation of the target, the target shareholders would recognize gain or loss with respect
to their shares. The target, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation, would
recognize no gain or loss upon liquidation. See I.1.C. § 332 (1994).
If the transaction were treated by the target as a sale of its assets followed by a liquidating
distribution of the sale proceeds to the target shareholders, the target shareholders would
recognize gain or loss with respect to their shares. See I.RIC. § 331 (1994). The target would
recognize no gain or loss upon the sale of its assets under the General Utilities doctrine. See I.R.C.
§ 337 (1954).
I5 See I.R.C. § 334(b) (1954).
1614 T.C. 74 (1950), afj'd per curian, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951).
17 In using the term "step up," I assume that in most instances assets will have a fair market
value in excess of their historic basis. Kimball-Diamond involved the opposite situation: the target's
historic basis in its assets was higher than the fair market value of the assets at the time of the
acquisition and the acquiring corporation wanted to preserve the higher historic basis by pur-
chasing target stock rather than assets. See id.
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corporation's stock to elect a tax-free step-up of the target's basis in its
assets without going through the mechanics of an actual liquidation. 8
Section 338 gave new owners of a corporation certain advantages
over historic owners. By making a § 338 election, new owners could
step up to fair market value the basis of the corporation's assets without
subjecting themselves to corporate level tax. One of the principal
benefits of a § 338 election was that it permitted the new owners to
"bust up" the corporation-that is, divest some or all of its assets-with-
out recognizing corporate gain.' 9 Historic owners of corporations were
not extended the same benefits as new owners.20 The 1986 repeal of
1
8
Both the history and operation of this election are quite complex. The 1954 Code permit-
ted a corporation acquiring the stock of a target corporation to be treated as if it had purchascd
target assets instead (provided that the acquiring corporation actually liquidated the target
corporation within a 12-month period after the acquisition). I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (as
amended by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982)). The acquiring corporation was, in effect, deemed to have purchased the assets of the
target corporation rather than its stock. This deemed asset purchase implicitly relied on the
General Utilities doctrine to protect the target corporation from gain recognition. If the target
corporation in fact sold its assets and distributed the proceeds to the target shareholders, any
gain at the target level would have gone unrecognized under the doctrine. Only the target
shareholders would incur tax on the liquidating distribution. Section 338 was enacted in 1982 as
the successor to old § 334(b) (2). Section 338 also permitted the purchaser of a target corpora-
tion's stock to elect to step up the target's assets and explicitly relied upon the General Utilities
doctrine to arrive at that treatment. Under § 338, a fictional "old" target corporation was deemed
to have sold its assets to a "new" target corporation and then liquidated, distributing the sale
proceeds to its shareholders. The asset sale and liquidating distribution were tax-free to the "old"
target corporation by reason of the General Utilities doctrine. See I.R.C. § 338(a) (1982) (as
amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)).
19The other major benefit was the increase in depreciation deductions attributable to
stepped-up basis.
20 They attempted to step up asset basis through a "liquidation-reincorporation," in which a
corporation would liquidate, distributing its assets to its shareholders, and then be reincorporated
by its shareholders. The transaction obtained the same results for historic owners as the § 338
election did for new owners: stepped-up corporate asset basis at a cost of only the shareholder
level tax. See generally Br-rKxR & EUSTICE, supra note 6, 1 11.05 at 11-16 to 11-17, 14.54 at
14-202 to 14-212 (explaining stakes in liquidation-reincorporations and various ways in which
liquidation-reincorporations were challenged).
Although the results for new owners were blessed congressionally by the enactment of§ 338,
the liquidation-reincorporation transaction was continually challenged, sometimes successfully,
by the government. Using the step transaction doctrine, the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service linked together the liquidation and subsequent reincorporation and recharacterized
them in ways that denied the sought-after tax benefits. See, e.g., Telephone Answering Serv. Co.
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), affd per curian, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977) (failure to liquidate completely by reason of subsequent reincorporation
results in gain recognition to corporation on sale of assets); Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62
(liquidation-reincorporation is in substance a tax-free reorganization with cash boot taxable as
dividend income). Furthermore, Congress amended the reorganization provisions in 1984 to
facilitate challenges to liquidation-reincorporation transactions. See I.R.C. § 368(a) (2) (H) (1986)
(expanding the definition to "control" required for type " D" reorganization, thereby making it
[Vol. 39:1087
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the General Utilities doctrine and amendment of § 338 equalized the
treatment of new and historic owners of corporations by eliminating
the ability of new owners to step up asset basis without triggering
corporate level tax.
21
B. Policies Underlying General Utilities' Repeal
The tensions described above led many prominent corporate tax
scholars to advocate repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 22 They
asserted that the schizophrenic state of affairs described above-in
which liquidating distributions and sales were both tax-free, but non-
liquidating distributions and sales were both taxable-irrationally fa-
easier to recharacterize liquidation-reincorporation as reorganization with boot). Historic owners
were similarly foreclosed from employing other techniques that relied on the General Utilities
doctrine to divest assets with no corporate level tax. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
texL
In addition to producing stepped-up asset basis for the corporation, the liquidation-reincor-
poration transaction also allowed shareholders to "bail out" earnings, that is, to remove accumu-
lated earnings as capital gains rather than as ordinary dividend income. See BrrrER & EUSTicE,
supra note 6, 14.54 at 14-202 to 14-203. Exactly the same sort of bail-out, however, occurred
in the case of a stock sale followed by a § 338 election, since the selling target corporation
shareholders would receive capital gains treatment with respect to their stock, thereby avoiding
dividend treatment with respect to any accumulated earnings in the target corporation.
21 Section 38 remains in the Code. An election to step up asset basis under § 338, however,
now comes at the cost of recognizing all gain at the target corporation level. Because the target
shareholders also recognize gain with respect to their stock, a § 338 election now results in two
levels of tax. An exception to this two-level tax treatment applies to elections made under
§ 338(h) (10). Under this provision, a sale of target corporation stock is deemed to be the sale
of target assets-thereby providing the acquirer with a stepped-up basis in target assets-and no
gain or loss is recognized with respect to the target corporation stock. The § 338(h) (10) election
is available only when the target corporation is a member of a selling affiliated group, and exists
because the selling group can achieve the same result by liquidating the target and then selling
its assets. The liquidation of the target is tax-free. See I.R.C. §§ 332, 337 (1994). The selling group
takes a carryover basis in the target assets received in the liquidation; therefore, a sale of those
assets triggers any gain accrued during the target's ownership of the assets. See I.C. § 334(b)
(1994).
2 2 See James B. Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in
Liquidation, HousE COMm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 3 COaeENnIUaM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING
THE TAX BASE 1643 (1959); A.L.I. FEDERAL INcoME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, PROPOSALS OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE AcQuIsrrIoNs AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S
STUDy ON CORORATE DISTIBUTIONS 102-19 (1982); Clark, supra note 1, at 152; Bernard
Wolfman, Corporate Distributions ofAppreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the General Utilities
Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 81 (1985); George IL Yin, General Utilities Repeafr Is Tax Reform
Really Going to Pass It By?, 31 TAX NOTES 1111 (1986).
Other prominent scholars argued in favor of the doctrine. See Richard C. E. Beck, Distribu-
tions in Kind in Corporate Liquidations: A Defense of General Utilities, 38 TAX LAw. 663 (1985);
Coven, supra note 2; Douglas A. Kahn, Should General Utilities Be Reinstated to Provide Partial
Integration of Corporate and Personal Income-Is Half a Loaf Better Than None?, 13J. CoRP. L. 953
(1988). It seems fair to characterize those who defend the doctrine as swimming against the
current.
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vored liquidating corporations over non-liquidating corporations. This
irrational distinction could be eliminated by making all asset distribu-
tions-both liquidating and non-liquidating-tax-free to the distribut-
ing corporation and all asset sales-both liquidating and non-liquida-
ting-taxable to the selling corporation. This, however, would create
yet another irrational distinction between corporations that distributed
assets to shareholders and those that sold their assets to third parties.23
In addition, any attempt to distinguish between corporate asset distri-
butions and sales was essentially arbitrary, turning on "shadowy and
excessively formal"24 considerations that elevated form over economic
substance.2 Furthermore, the doctrine's advantageous treatment of
new owners relative to historic owners-via § 338-created an undesir-
able non-neutrality that encouraged takeovers.
26
The lawmakers who enacted the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine relied on two grounds, both of which were drawn from the
2 See, e.g., A.L.I. FEDERAL INcomz TAX PROJECT, supra note 22, at 111-12.
24 1d. at 106.
25 See, e.g., id. at 106-8.
26 See Coven, supra note 2, at 167 ("[T]he taxing system ought not to provide a tax incentive
to corporation acquisitions. Under current law, that principle of tax neutrality between continu-
ing and acquired businesses is not a mere abstract ideal; rather, it has become a firmly established
congressional policy. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine ... reflect[s] the entirely proper
ascension of that policy of neutrality."); Yn, supra note 22, at 1115-16 ("[F]ew could dispute that
the General Utilities doctrine is not neutral, and that to the extent it bears any influence at all on
acquisition and merger activity, it operates as a force in favor of such activity. It is difficult to see
how the current Congress would want to preserve the General Utilities tax preference for this
economic effect.").
Tax scholars also made other arguments in favor of General Utilitie' repeal. They argued
that the doctrine undermined collection of the corporate level tax. See, e.g., David J, Shakow,
Withe, "C-, 45 TAX L. REv. 177, 192 (1990). They also criticized the doctrine for distorting
corporate business decisions. See, e.g., A.L.I. FEDERAL INcOME TAX PROjECT, supra note 22, at
111-12. Furthermore, they complained that the doctrine added enormous complexity to the law
by creating opportunities for avoidance behavior, which, in turn, engendered a web of statutory
provisions and judicial doctrines attempting to thwart such avoidance behavior. See, e.g., Clark,
supra note 1, at 152.
One avoidance strategy was the liquidation-reincorporation transaction, which enabled a
corporation to "bail out" earnings-that is, distribute the liquid assets to shareholders at capital
gains rates, rather than distributing them as higher-taxed dividends-and obtain a stepped-up
basis for the operating assets returned to corporate solution. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
Another avoidance technique involved the so-called "collapsible corporation," that is, a
corporation set up to acquire ordinary income-generating assets such as receivables and inven-
tory. The corporation would then be liquidated, thereby stepping-up the basis of these assets in
the hands of shareholders at the cost of only a capital gains tax at the shareholder level. To
combat the collapsible corporation, Congress enacted § 341. See generally BirrXER & EuSTICE,
supra note 6, 12 (describing § 341 and its operation). Section 341 has been described as "the
most complex provision of Subchapter C," "characterized by a pathological degree of complexity,
vagueness and uncertainty." A.LI. FEDERAL INCo~m TAX PROJECT, supra note 22, at 111; Clark,
supra note 1, at 135.
[Vol. 39:1087
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academic literature. First, the doctrine "tend[ed] to undermine the
corporate income tax."27 Second, the doctrine encouraged tax-moti-
vated, uneconomic acquisitions, which thereby contributed to an un-
desirably high level of takeover activity.28 In order to understand fully
the nature of this second ground, it is necessary to understand the
hostility of politicians and business leaders toward takeovers during the
1980s.
The 1980s was a period of intense takeover activity in which "lev-
eraged buy-outs"--takeovers financed by borrowed funds secured by
target assets and cash flows-were prominent. Business leaders and
members of Congress expressed concern that highly-leveraged corpo-
rations, owned by "raiders" whose focus was on short-term cash *flow,
would undermine the U.S. economy by increasing bankruptcy rates
and causing under-investment in long-term research and develop-
ment.29 Against this backdrop of concern, many tax provisions were
enacted that imposed new costs on takeovers. 30 For example, new re-
strictions were imposed on the deductibility of interest payments by
highly-leveraged corporations.8 ' A new excise tax was imposed on
"greenmail," that is, payments made by corporate targets to raiders to
induce them to abandon their takeover bids. 2 In addition, stringent
limitations were imposed on an acquiring corporation's ability to use
the tax attributes, such as net operating loss carryovers, of a target
corporation. 8 Repealing the General Utilities doctrine-in particular,
eliminating the ability of new owners to elect a tax-free step-up in target
27 H.R REP. No. 99-426, at 282 (1985), reprinted in 3 C.B. 282 (1986).
28 See id. at 267, reprinted in 3 C.B. 267 (1986).
2 See, e.g., Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeovers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and
Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance on S. 420, S. 476, and S. 632, 99th Cong. 68
(1985) (statement ofJames R.Jones, U.S. Representative from Oklahoma); Tax Aspects of Acqui-
sitions and Mergers: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 48 (1985) (statement of John H.
Chafee, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island).
30 See generally STAFF OF JoInT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., FEDERAL INcoME TAX
ASPECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND OTER CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (AND S.
420, S. 476 AND S. 632) 9 (Comm. Print 1985) (description of tax provisions encouraging
takeovers); STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF
MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS 13 (Comm. Print 1985). For a good description of the political and
business reaction to takeovers and leveraged buyouts during the mid-1980s, see Patricia L. Bryan,
Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Poly, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1039, 1039-43 (1987).
31 See I.R.C. § 1630) (1994) (originally enacted by § 7210(a) of Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2339 (1990)).
32 See I.R.C. § 5881 (1994) (originally enacted by § 10228(a) of Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330-1417 (1987)).
88See I.R.C. § 382 (1994) (originally enacted by § 621(a) of Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2254 (1986)).
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assets under § 338-was yet another tax law change that decreased the
attractiveness of takeovers.
C. The World of General Utilities' Repeal
Without the General Utilities doctrine, corporate distributions of
appreciated property, like sales of appreciated property, are taxable to
the corporation. 4 Furthermore, after General Utilities' repeal, the pur-
chaser of a target corporation's stock can no longer elect to have the
target corporation step up its asset basis tax-free. The 1986 repeal of
the General Utilities doctrine thus helped "build a level playing field"8 5
for historic and new owners of corporations by eliminating the ability
of new owners to step up asset basis without triggering corporate level
tax. 6 It also eliminated the favorable tax treatment of corporate prop-
s4 Losses realized by a corporation upon distribution of property are not as freely recognized
as gains. See I.R.C. § 311(a) (1994) (disallowing loss recognition for nonliquidating property
distributions); I.R.C. § 336(d) (1994) (disallowing loss recognition for certain liquidating prop-
erty distributions).
Certain exceptions to corporate gain recognition continue to exist under General Uilities'
repeal, the most significant of which is the tax-free divisive reorganization, or "spin-off." See
generally I.LC. § 355 (1994) (requirements for tax-free treatment). The requirements for tax-free
spin-offs have become more stringent in recent years as a result of regulatory and legislative
action. For a detailed description of all the provisions governing spin-offs, see MARTIN D.
GINSBURG ET AL., MERGERS, ACQuIsrriONS, AND BuyouTs: A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TIlE
GoVERNING TAx, LEGAL, AND AcCouNTiNG CONSIDmEATIoNs 833-921 (July 1996 ed.).
Another exception to the recognition rule exists for a corporation making a liquidating
distribution to a corporate shareholder owning 80% of the stock of the distributing corporation.
See I.RLC. § 337 (1994). In this case, the distributee corporation also recognizes no gain upon
receipt of the distribution and takes a carryover basis in the property received. See I.R.C. §§ 332,
334(b) (1994). The purpose of these provisions is to prevent the possibility of more than two
levels of tax being imposed with respect to assets in corporate solution. Recognition of any gain
inherent in the assets is deferred until such time as the corporate shareholder itself liquidates
and distributes assets to its individual shareholders. At that time, both the liquidating corporation
and the shareholders recognize gain. See BrrrxER & EUSTiCE, supra note 6, 11.41 at 11-44.
A third exception to the recognition rule exists for distributions of appreciated property
made within an affiliated group filing a consolidated return. Gains are recognized but arc
deferred until the occurrence of a triggering event, such as the subsequent sale of the property
outside the affiliated group. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(f) (7) ex. 1 (as amended in 1996).
A fourth exception applies to certain tax-free acquisitive reorganizations where liquidation
of the target corporation is either required or permitted. See, e.g, I.R.C. § 368(b) (2) (G) (1994)
(requiring target corporation to distribute stock or securities of acquiring corporation; liquidation
permitted). See generally George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAx L. REv. 573, 596-619 (1987) (describing effect of General
Utilities repeal on reorganization provisions).
5Stephan, supra note 2, at 658.
36Section 338 remained unchanged on its face after 1986. However, because the deemed
liquidation by the target corporation is no longer tax-free, an election to step up asset basis under
§ 338 now comes at the cost of recognizing all gain at the target corporation level. I.R.C. § 338(a)
(1994).
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erty distributions relative to corporate property sales. One must in-
quire, however, whether these new neutralities are desirable.
The following Part develops a framework that draws on economic
finance and corporate theory to explain the causes and consequences
of corporate acquisitions and divestitures. Using this framework, the
Article then explores and evaluates the effects of the General Utilities
doctrine and its repeal. The Article finds that certain of the non-neu-
tralities caused by the General Utilities doctrine in fact were socially
desirable because they offset the managerial tendency to acquire or
retain assets when it was uneconomic to do so. Moreover, repeal of the
doctrine created new non-neutralities that exacerbated this managerial
tendency.
II. FiRm SIZE, FREE CASH FLOW AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL
This Part examines the financial economic literature exploring
the causes and consequences of takeovers. Financial economists have
observed that mergers and acquisitions perform two, somewhat con-
tradictory, roles in the economy. On the one hand, they are a means
through which some managers promote their own parochial interests
in building inefficient, diversified empires. On the other hand, they
are a means through which market forces take corporate assets out of
the hands of managers who behave too inefficiently. Moreover, they
present an opportunity to increase leverage, which tends to align the
incentives of post-acquisition management with interests of sharehold-
ers.
A. Managers' Urge to Merge
The large conglomerate is commonly viewed as a manifestation of
the divergent interest of corporate management and shareholders
5 7
Michael Jensen's "free cash flow" hypothesis conceptualizes the dy-
37 Corporate law theorists characterize the relationship between shareholders and managers
as that of principal and agent. The agency relationship between shareholders and managers is,
in turn, incorporated into the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm, which views the corporation
as a nexus of contracts among shareholders, managers, creditors, employees and others. See
generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory oftheFirm, 88J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavio, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3J. Fim. ECON. 305 (1976). The nexus-of-contracts theory is undoubtedly
the dominant paradigm today. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. RPv. 1395, 1408 (1989);Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Manda-
tory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLTJM. L. Pv. 1549, 1549 (1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The
Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fische 89 COLuM. L.
REv. 1449, 1449 (1989).
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namic by which firms can become too large or too diversified. 8Jensen
theorizes that managers have incentives to retain free cash flow rather
than distributing it to shareholders, and to use the free cash flow to
make negative net present value investments. 9 This incentive may stem
from links between compensation and firm size, or from the correla-
tion between a manager's power and prestige and the size of his or her
firm. 0 It may also stem from managers' risk aversion coupled with their
inability to diversify their human capital.41 Managers can reduce the
risk of failure or poor performance by either increasing the size of
their firms42 or by diversifying their firms' business, 4 and they may do
3
8 See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 323 (Paper & Proceedings, May 1986) [hereinafterJensen, Agency
Costs ofFree Cash Flow]; Michael C.Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2J. ECON,
PEnsP. 21 (1988) [hereinafter Jensen, Takeovers]; Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy:
Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKE-
OVER 314 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (hereinafterJensen, The Takeover Controversy].
9 SeeJensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 323; Jensen, Takeovers, supra
note 38, at 28-29;Jensen, The Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 321-22.
Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the empirical validity ofJensen's cash flow
hypothesis. See, e.g., Sidney G. Winter, Routines, CashFlows, and Unconventional Assets: Corporate
Change in the 1980s, in Tim DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 55, 72-74 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993). However, there is a
growing body of empirical work supporting Jensen's hypothesis and its implications. See Larry
H.P. Lang et al., A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns, 29J. FIN,
EcoN. 315, 334 (1991) (gains from takeovers fall as free cash flow increases); Kenneth Lehn &
Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN.
771 (1989) (likelihood of going private is directly related to free cash flow, and premiums paid
to shareholders in private transactions are positively and significantly related to undistributed
cash flow); Richard L. Smith &Joo-Hyun Kim, The Combined Effects ofFree CashFlow andFinancial
Slack on Bidder and Target Stock Returns, 6 7 J. Bus. 281 (1994) (gains from merger and acquisi-
tions activity reflect, in part, resolution of overinvestment problem associated with free cash flow
hypothesis; bidders with high free cash flow tend to overpay for their targets); see also Roberta
Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 131-33,
149-50 (1992) (summary of empirical studies supporting free cash flow explanation of takeovers).
40 See generally GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A
Com:iREHENsivE FINANCXAL GOALS SysTmm (1984); GORON DONALDSON &JAY LoRScH, DECI-
SION MAKING AT THE Top (1983); George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice
vs. Theory, 43.J. FiN. 593, 609 (1988).
41 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPAcT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 77, 82-85 (John C.
Coffee,Jr. et al. eds., 1988);Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37, at 349-50, 352-53; AlanJ. Marcus,
Risk Sharing and the Theory of theFirm, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 369 (1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk
Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991). See generally
RONALD W. MASums, THE DEaT/Equrry CHOICE 47-60 (1988);Jensen & Meckling, supra note
37, at 308-10.
42 See DONALDSON, supra note 40; DONALDSON & LORSCH, supra note 40.
43 See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers, 12 BFLLJ. ECON. 605, 606 (1981); Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz, Tobin's q, Corporate
Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102J. POL. ECON. 1248 (1994) (diversified firms perform
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so even if it means making negative net present value investments.
Because shareholders can easily diversify their portfolios, however, they
have no interest in such strategies.
The precursor of Jensen's free cash flow theory is the growth
maximization hypothesis developed by scholars including William Bau-
mol, Robin Marris, Oliver Williamson and Merritt Fox.44 Similar to
Jensen's free cash flow theory, the growth maximization hypothesis
posits that managers have incentives to maximize the growth or size of
their firms even at the expense of shareholder wealth. These incentives
are analogous to those Jensen identified. Marris theorizes that firm
growth provides managers with greater monetary and psychic compen-
sation, as well as increased job security.45 Similarly, Williamson attrib-
utes to managers an "expense preference," that is, a preference for
expenditures that increase staff, firm size and managerial discretion.
46
worse than undiversified firms); Randall M0rck et al., Do Managerial Obectives Drive Bad Acqui-
sitions?, 45J. Fin. 31, 31-32 (1990); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and
the Acquisition Process, 2 J. EcoN. Ptsi. 7, 13-15 (1988) [hereinafter Shleifer & Vishny, Value
Maximization].
44 SeeWILLIAmJ. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1959); Mxntrr B. Fox,
FInANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAmc ECONomy: THEoRY, PRACTICE, AND
POLCY (1987); RoBnIN MARRiS, THE ECONOMic THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPrrALIsM (1964)
[hereinafter MARIus, MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM]; Robin Marris, A Model of the 'Managerial'En-
terprise, 77 QJ. EcoN. 185 (1963) [hereinafter Marris, Managerial Enterprise]; Oliver E. William-
son, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 Am. EcoN. REv. 1032 (1963); see alsoJohn
C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1,
20-21, 28-31 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Strain in the Corporate Web] (describing growth maxi-
mization hypothesis); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEo. LJ. 1495, 1499-1501 (1990) [hereinafter Coffee, Unstable Coalitions]
(noting link between growth maximization and free cash flow theories).
45 MARRIs, MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM, supra note 44, at 61-66; Marris, Managerial Enterprise,
supra note 44, at 186-91.
4sWilliamson, supra note 44, at 1034-36. John Coffee restates Marris and Williamson's
theories in terms of risk and posits that managers are more risk averse than shareholders because
their investment in their firm cannot be diversified as easily as shareholders' portfolios. Therefore,
managers maximize growth to increase job security and otherwise to reduce risk. See Coffee, Strain
in the Corporate Web, supra note 44, at 16-25, 29-30.
An alternative theory explaining why firms may become suboptimally large is the hubris
theory, first formulated by Richard Roll. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers, 59J. Bus. 197 (1986). This theory posits that managers are overly optimistic about their
ability to realize value from potential acquisitions and therefore overpay for businesses or buy
them more often than they ought to. There is some empirical support for this theory. See Mathew
LA. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:
Evidence of CEO Hubris, _ AnDmin. Sci. Q. _ (forthcoming 1998) (indicators of CEO hubris are
highly associated with size of acquisition premiums paid; the greater the CEO hubris and size of
premium paid, the greater the magnitude of shareholder losses); Nikhil P. Varaiya, The "Wnner ;
Curse"Hpothesis and Corporate Takeovers, 9 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcON. 209 (1988) (takeover
premium exceeds combined market value of bidder and target firms). But see Romano, supra
note 39, at 151 ("[T]arget gains are greater than bidder losses, indica[ting] that takeovers involve
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The managerial preference for size and diversification reveals
itself in acquisitions that reduce the value of the acquirer. Several
empirical studies have uncovered such acquisitions. Michael Porter, for
example, studied the diversification programs of thirty-three large pres-
tigious U.S. companies from 1950 through 1986 and found most of
them to be unsuccessful, as evidenced by subsequent divestitures.
47
Similarly, Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny stud-
ied 326 mergers from 1975 through 1987 and found that diversifying
acquisitions and acquisitions that maximized growth had lower returns
than other acquisitions.
48
B. Takeovers as a Solution to the Problem
Jensen's free cash flow theory casts takeovers not only as evidence
of the conflict between shareholders and managers but also as a solu-
tion to the problem.4 9 Takeovers reduce managers' ability to engage in
self-serving, value-decreasing acquisitions in three ways.50 First, bust-up
more than simply a wealth transfer from bidder shareholders to managers and target shareholders
.... [The] hubris hypothesis, therefore, is not a long-run equilibrium explanation because
bidders should learn from their experience and adjust their bids downward."). In addition, the
theory is quite prevalent in the popular press. See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, Snapple Is Just the Latest
Case of Mismatched Reach and Grasp, N.Y. Trams, Mar. 29, 1997, at A4; Terence Bentley, Putting
the Right People on In-House M & A Teams, MERGERS & AcQUxsrrboNs, May/June 1996, at 30;
Marcia Berss, Hubris in Columbus, FonBss, Feb. 27, 1995, at 56; Paula Dwyer, Saatchi: The House
that Hubris Wrecked Bus. Wk., Feb. 3, 1997, at 15 (book review); Michael Geczi, Say Why a Merger
Is Benefcia4 U.S. BANXER, Feb. 1995, at 80; Steve Lohr, To Divide or Combine?, N.Y. Tes, Sept.
25, 1995, at DI; Mergers: Will They Ever Learn 7, Bus. Wk., Oct. 30, 1995, at 178;Joan Warner, The
World Is Not Always Your Oyster, Bus. Wk., Oct. 30, 1995, at 132; Phillip L. Zweig ct al., The Case
Against Mergers, Bus. Wk., Oct. 30, 1995, at 122, 125.
The hubris theory complements the theories discussed here in two ways. First, the opportu-
nity for hubris may be especially attractive when the acquirer's management is paying with
shareholders' money. Second, management's personal interest in an acquisition may color its
perception of the shareholder value that is likely to arise.
47 See Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, HARv. Bus. Rv.,
May-June 1987, at 43 [hereinafter Porter, Competitive Advantage]. The findings of Steven Kaplan
and Michael Weisbach differ somewhat from Porter's. They report that 44% of target assets were
divested in large acquisitions (both diversifying and nondiversifying) completed between 1971
and 1982, a somewhat smaller percentage than Porter's. Steven N. Kaplan & Michael S. Weisbach,
The Success ofAcquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures, 47J. FIN. 107, 108 (1992). In addition, they
differentiate between successful and unsuccessful divestitures and find only weak evidence that
diversification programs are value-reducing. See id. at 109. However, in support of managerial
motives for acquisitions, they do find that acquirers in unsuccessful acquisitions have higher levels
of free cash flow than acquirers in successful acquisitions. See id.
48 See Morck et al., supra note 43; see also David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, Mergers,
Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (1987) (diversfying
acquisitions'of 1960s did not improve profitability; one-third of all acquisitions were subsequently
divested).
49Jensen, Agency Costs ofFree Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 328.
5°Jensen's observation that takeovers can reduce agency costs follows a well-established view,
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takeovers-those in which an acquirer subsequently breaks up the
target and sells various businesses to various purchasers-dismantle
suboptimally large or diversified firms.-1 Second, leveraged buyouts-
takeovers financed by borrowed funds secured by target assets and cash
flows-increase debt levels of target firms, thereby decreasing free cash
flow. 52 Third, the threat of a hostile takeover deters managers from
making noneconomic investments and motivates them to divest exist-
ing ones.5 In sum, some takeovers are manifestations of managers'
tendencies to make inefficient acquisitions, while other takeovers are
evidence of the means through which the market disciplines these
inefficient managers.
1. Inefficient Acquirers Become Targets
Managers who operate their firms too inefficiently run the risk of
having their firms become takeover targets. Managers who too easily
give in to the self-interested urge to merge may expose themselves to
the discipline of the market for corporate control. This link between
misusing free cash flow and being targeted for takeover has been borne
out in several empirical studies 4 Mark Mitchell and Kenneth Lehn
found that bidders who make negative net present value acquisitions-
that is, those who wasted excess cash flow-are likely to become take-
over targets themselves.55 Similarly, Jensen explains how firms in de-
clining industries with high levels of free cash flow are likely to engage
in value-reducing diversification programs and thereby face the threat
of takeover. He cites the tobacco, oil, food and broadcasting industries
pioneered by Henry Manne, that takeovers motivate managers to maximize shareholder value.
See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 117
(1965).
51 See Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 328; Jensen, The Takeover
Controversy, supra note 38, at 319.
52 SeeJensen, Agency Costs ofFree CashFlow, supra note 38, at 324-26;Jensen, Takeovers, supra
note 38, at 29-32; Jensen, 7e Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 322-23; infra note 68 and
accompanying text (describing manner in which increased leverage reduces agency cost of free
cash flow in more detail).
53 SeeJensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 328; Jensen, Takeovers, supra
note 38, at 28; Jensen, The Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 319.
54 See, e.g., Lang et al., supra note 39 (gains from takeovers fall as free cash flow increases);
Lehn & Poulsen, supra note 39 (likelihood of going private is directly related to free cash flow
and premiums paid to shareholders in ongoing private transactions are positively and significantly
related to undistributed cash flow); Smith & Kim, supra note 39 (gains from merger and
acquisition activity reflect, in part, resolution of overinvestment problem associated with free cash
flow hypothesis; bidders with high free cash flow tend to overpay for their targets).
55 See Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets? 98 J. POL.
EcoN. 372, 396 (1990) (empirical study finding that some takeovers discipline managers who use
free cash flow to make value-reducing acquisitions while other takeovers promote economic
efficiency by reallocating target assets to higher-valued uses).
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as instances where this has occurred.5 6 His account of the oil industry
during the 1970s, for example, is well-developed and compelling. At
that time companies were plagued by excess capacity while they en-
joyed high cash flows and profits.57 Managers wasted free cash flow by,
among other actions, making poor acquisitions outside the industry. 8
Subsequently, the threat of hostile takeovers led to mergers and re-
structurings within the industry that paid out large amounts to share-
holders, increased debt levels and reduced wasteful expenditures,
thereby reducing the agency costs of free cash flow.59
Mitchell and Lehn provide Sir James Goldsmith's unsuccessful
attempt to acquire Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in October
1986 as a case study supporting their claim that "bad bidders become
good targets."60 Three years before Goldsmith's attempted takeover,
Goodyear had diversified into the oil business by purchasing an oil
company for $800 million. 61 As evidenced by a $359 million decline in
the trading value of Goodyear's shares, the market perceived the pur-
chase to be wasteful.62 Goldsmith made a hostile tender offer for
Goodyear's shares and announced his intention, if successful, to sell
Goodyear's diversified assets and return to its core business.63 Although
Goldsmith's offer failed, Goodyear responded to the attempted take-
over by adopting a restructuring program similar to the one proposed
by Goldsmith, and divested significant portions of its non-core-business
Roberta Romano describes Mitchell and Lehn's finding as: "[A] fascinating marriage of
Marris's, Manne's, and Jensen's explanations: firms whose managers engage in non-valuc-maxi-
mizing acquisitions, wasting free cash flow, are themselves acquired, in keeping with the agency
cost reduction's hypothesis that takeovers discipline inefficient managers." ROBERTA RotANo,
FOUNDATioNS OF CoRaoRAAT LAw 263 (1993). Takeovers are thus both the epitome of the agency
problem and its solution. See id.
56 SeeJensen, Agency Costs ofFree CashFlow, supra note 38, at 326-28;Jcnscn, Takeovers, supra
note 38, at 32-36;Jensen, The Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 329-34.
57 SeeJensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 326; Jensen, Takeovers, supra
note 38, at 32-33;Jensen, The Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 329-32.
58For example, Mobil bought Marcor (a retailing firm); Exxon bought Reliance Electric
(manufacturing) and Vydec (office equipment); Sohio bought Kennecott (mining); ARCO
bought Anaconda Minerals (mining) and Amoco bought Cyprus Mines (mining). SeeJcnsen,
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 327; Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 38, at 34;
Jensen, The Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 332.
59 For example, the Gulf/Chevron, Getty/Texaco and Dupont/Conoco mergers resulted in
over $17 billion in gains to shareholders. Also, Phillips, Unocal and ARCO undertook rcstructur-
ings that produced increases in market value totaling $6.6 billion. SeeJensen, Agency Costs ofFree
Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 327; Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 38, at 34; Jensen, The Takeover
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assets.6 Thus, Goldsmith's takeover threat disciplined Goodyear's man-
agers, compelling them to divest their unwise acquisitions and pay out
excess cash flows to shareholders.
Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny provide an ad-
ditional explanation of the merger wave of the 1980s consistent with
the dual role of free cash flow theory in takeovers.6 They studied a
sample of sixty-two hostile takeover contests between 1984 and 1986 in
an effort to determine the sources of gains from takeovers. They found
that hostile takeovers by raiders and leveraged buyout firms were often
followed by divestitures of target businesses to strategic buyers, that is,
firms in the same industry as the target businesses they purchased.
66
They theorized that raiders and leveraged buyout firms acted as bro-
kers who acquired diversified firms and then busted them up, reselling
the assets to buyers with synergies to offer.67 In this way, takeovers
64 See id. at 374-75. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny also theorize that the takeovers of the
1980s reversed the non-value-maximizing diversification undertaken in the 1960s by managers
with large free cash flows. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Takeovers in the '60s and the
'80s: Evidence and Implications, 12 STRArEGIC MGMT.J. 51,57 (1991); see also Morck et al., supra
note 43 (finding that managerial objectives led to uneconomic diversification programs in the
1970s and 1980s; speculating that the takeovers and defensive restructurings of the 1980s simply
reversed past conglomeration); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Buyouts as a
Response to Market Pressure, in MERGERs AND AcQuisrrxoNs 87, 90 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988)
[hereinafter Shleifer & Vishny, Management Buyouts] (high inflation in late 1970s and early 1980s
reduced real corporate debt obligations, leading to excess free cash flow); Shleifer & Vishny, Value
Maximization, supra note 43.
6 See Sanja Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization,
in BRootmNGs PAPERS ON EcoNomc AcTIvrry (James R. Schneider et al. eds., 1990).
6 See id. at 40.
67 See id. at 44. Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny do not adopt cash flow theory as an explanation
for why the diversified firms came into existence, or for why they then became takeover targets.
In fact, they explicitly rejectJensen's claim that the takeovers of the 1980s resulted in organiza-
tional and capital structure changes-concentrated ownership and high debt levels-that re-
duced the free cash flow of target firms. Instead, they note that many of the takeovers were
followed by subsequent divestitures to strategic buyers. Thus, they argue, the concentrated
ownership and high leverage created by initial takeovers were only temporary. See id. at 40, 44;
see also Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb.
1990, at 96 (leveraged buyouts are inherently transitory; high debt levels and concentrated
ownership impose costs of inflexibility); cf Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged
Buyouts, 29 J. FiN. ECON. 287, 290 (1991) (leveraged buyouts are not permanent, but are not
short-lived either; after going public, leveraged buyouts have higher levels of debt and concen-
trated ownership than pre-buyout and median public-company levels). Rather, Bhagat, Shleifer
and Vtshny offer competing explanations for these phenomena. They speculate that diversified
firms came about through the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s, as a result both of aggressive
antitrust regulation, which prevented consolidation of U.S. industries, and the market's overesti-
mation of the gains from diversification. See Bhagat et al., supra note 65, at 55, 57. In the 1980s,
antitrust regulation eased, and the bust-up acquisitions of the 1980s dismantled the conglomer-
ates and reallocated assets to firms with the same industry specialization, thereby producing gains
from increased concentration. See id. at 56.
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dismantled the inefficient conglomerates resulting from unwise invest-
ments of excess cash flow.
2. Debt-Financed Versus Stock-Financed Acquisitions
Another implication of the free cash flow theory is that debt-
financed acquisitions are more likely to be value-enhancing than eq-
uity-financed acquisitions. This follows from the fact that managers can
bond themselves to pay out free cash flow on debt-which carries fixed
payment obligations-but not on equity.68 Empirical evidence demon-
strates that acquisitions accompanied by high levels of debt reduce the
Despite their disavowal of cash flow theory as an explanatory aid, Bhagat, Shlcifer and Vishny
tell a story that is, for the most part, consistent with a cash flow theory account. Under the free
cash flow theory account, diversified firms came into existence during the 1960s because man-
agers used excess cash flow to fund uneconomic investments. The 1980s acquisitions reversed
these uneconomic diversification programs and implemented organizational and capital struc-
ture changes-specifically concentrated share ownership and increased leverage-that reduce
future cash flows. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny's
explanation is not completely consistent with cash flow theory because, as they point out, most
of the acquisitions they studied, as well as other acquisitions during the same time period, involved
reallocations of assets to related firms rather than permanent free-cash-flow-reducdng organiza-
tional and capital structure changes in target firms. However, the reallocation of assets that
resulted from these acquisitions is consistent with the unwinding of wasteful free cash flow
expenditures. See Morck et al., supra note 43 (finding that managerial objectives led to uneco-
nomic diversification programs in 1970s and 1980s; speculating that takeovers and defensive
restructurings of 1980s simply reversed past conglomeration). Moreover, asJensen points out, to
avoid being taken over, many firms adopted restructuring programs that did permanently reduce
cash flow. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
68 SeeJensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 324; Jensen, Takeovers, supra
note 38, at 29; Jensen, The Takeover Controversy, supra note 38, at 322; see also Ren6 M. Stulz,
Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1990) (use of debt to
reduce free cash flow and managerial agency costs); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public
Corporation, HARV. Bus. Rxv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 (predicting decline of publicly-held, equity-
funded corporations and rise of closely-held, debt-funded corporations in order to reduce agency
costs of free cash flow).
Jensen's debt finance versus stock finance hypothesis is an outgrowth of the literature
describing the role of debt generally in reducing managerial agency costs. Juxtaposed with this
literature on conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders is an extensive literature
on conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders. These two bodies of literature
sometimes formulate conflicting theories that explain the same empirical observations. Thus, for
example, the bondholder/shareholder literature theorizes that shareholders can expropriate
wealth from bondholders by increasing outstanding debt, spinning off assets, or divesting low risk
assets. See MAsuus, supra note 41, at 35-46 (general description of debt/equity agency costs).
Under this theory, the observed correlation of new debt issuances with stock value increases is
explained as a wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders rather than by reference to a
reduction in managerial discretion over free cash flow.
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agency costs of free cash flow.6 9 Moreover, empirical studies show that
acquisitions funded by stock tend to be value-decreasing.
70
As described above, many of the conglomerate mergers of the
1960s proved to be unsuccessful.71 These mergers were often financed
by the issuance of stock by the acquiring company in exchange for
target company stock or assets. 72 Shleifer and Vishny theorized that the
1960s merger wave was driven by large corporate cash flows and high
valuations of company stock. Rather than paying out cash flows to
6 9 See George P. Baker & Karen H. Wruck, Organizational Changes and Value Creation in
Leveraged Buyouts, 25J. FiN. EcoN. 163, 167 (1989) (case study of leveraged buyout of O.M. Scott
& Sons Company finds that pressure of servicing heavy debt load and management equity
ownership leads to improved performance); Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts
on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. EcoN. 217 (1989) (post-management-buyout
improvements in performance attributable to reduced agency costs produced by increased lever-
age, centralized ownership and increased monitoring by buyout team); Michael T. Maloney et
al., Managerial Decision Making and Capital Structure, 66 J. Bus. 189 (1993) (bidder returns
increase with level of debt which is consistent with claim that, where there is less free cash flow
or more creditor monitoring, acquisitions are value-maximizing); Karen H. Wruck, Financial
Policy, Internal Control and Performance: Sealed Air Corporation's Leveraged Special Dividend, 36J.
FIN. EcoN. 157 (1994) (leveraged special dividend produced dramatic improvement in perform-
ance).
70 See Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporation
Acquisitions?, _J. FiN. _ (forthcoming 1998); Maloney et al., supra note 69, at 189 (bidder
returns increase with level of debt, which is consistent with cialm that, where there is less free
cash flow or more creditor monitoring, acquisitions are value-maximizing).
Many studies find that an acquiring firm's stock has a negative price reaction upon the
announcement of stock-financed acquisitions, or that bidder returns are lower for stock-financed
as compared to cash or debt-financed acquisitions. SeeJulian R. Franks et al., Means of Payment
in Takeovers: Results for the United Kingdom and the United States, in CoaroRATE TAxEovERs:
CAUSES AND CONsEQuENcEs 221 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988); Henri Servaes, Tobin's Q and the
Gains from Takeovers, 46J. FIN. 409 (1991); Nickolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods
of Payment, and BiddingFirms' Stock Returns, 42J. FIN. 943 (1987);James W. Wansley et al., Gains
to BidderFirms in Cash and Securities Transactions, 22 FIN. REv. 403 (1987); see alsoYakov Amihud
et al., Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions,
45J. FIN. 603 (1990) (significant negative bidder returns for stock-financed acquisitions but only
for those bidders with low management ownership). In addition, other studies find that post-ac-
quisitions returns are lower for stock-financed acquisitions than for cash-financed acquisitions.
See, e.g., Anup Agrawal et al., The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A R-Examination
of an Anomaly, 47J. FiN. 1605 (1992).
The empirical studies described above are consistent with the cash flow theory prediction
that stock-financed acquisitions are more likely to be value-reducing than debt-financed acquisi-
tions. The theoretical work prompting these studies, however, has focused on asymmetric infor-
mation about the value of the acquirer or the target as a determinant of method of payment. See
B. Espen Eckbo et al., Asymmetric Information and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory
and Tests, 3 REv. FiN. STUD. 651 (1990); Robert G. Hansen, A Theory for the Choice of Exchange
Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions, 60J. Bus. 75 (1987).
7 1 See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
72 See Shleifer & Vishny, Management Buyouts, supra note 64, at 51-52.
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shareholders, managers issued new stock to make acquisitions.7" In
contrast, the mergers of the 1980s-financed primarily by debt-en-
hanced value in part through increased debt levels.74
The current merger wave, which consists primarily of stock-
financed acquisitions, may prove to support the claim that stock-
financed acquisitions are not value-enhancing. The merger wave of the
1990s is becoming a tsunami. It has already surpassed the 1980s wave
in terms of volume. In 1988, the height of the 1980s wave, $353 billion
in deals were completed; in 1995, $518 billion in deals were com-
pleted;75 and in 1996, $650 billion were completed.76 The current
mergers differ, however, from those of the 1980s in that they are
primarily financed by stock of the acquiring company rather than by
debt.77 Consistent with the predictions of free cash flow theory, there
is already evidence that the current mergers are not value-enhancing.
Business Week and Mercer Management Consulting conducted a sur-
vey of 150 recent deals valued at $500 million or more. They found
that about half decreased shareholder wealth, as measured in relation
to the Standard & Poor's industry indexes, and that one-third contrib-
uted only marginally to shareholder wealth.78 Anecdotal evidence also
indicates that some prominent mergers are misconceived. For exam-
ple, Time's merger with Warner,79 Disney's acquisition of Capital Cit-
ies/ABC,80 AT&T's acquisition of NCR,81 and Time Warner's acquisi-
73 See id. at 52. Shleifer and Vishny's hypothesis contradictsJensen's casual remark that stock
acquisitions are likely to be associated with growth opportunities and a shortage of free cash flow.
SeeJensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, supra note 38, at 329.
74 See Shleifer & Vishny, Management Buyouts, supra note 64, at 57.
75 See Charles V. Bagli, MCI Deal Would Speed Pace of Current Mergers, N.Y. TWEs, Nov. 2,
1996, at A5.
76 See Steven Lipin, Merger Wave Gathers Force as Strategies Demand Buying or Being Bought,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1997, at Al.
77Unlike the mergers of the 1960s, however, the current mergers are motivated primarily by
perceived synergies rather than diversification. See, e.g., Michael H. Lubatkin & Peter J. Lane,
Psst ... The Merger Mavens Still Have It Wrong, 10 ACAD. MGarr. EXECUTIVWs 21, 28-31 (1996);
David Whitford & Caroline Bollinger, Sale of the Century, FORTUNE MAG., Feb. 17, 1997, at 92;
Zweig et al., supra note 46, at 122.
78 See Zweig et al., supra note 46, at 124 (describing survey).
79 See Zweig et al., supra note 46, at 128 (chart listing "worst megadeals of the 1990s" includes
Time/Warner merger).
80 See Lohr, supra note 46, at DI (quoting Michael Porter, "Disney's a great company, but for
the life of me, I don't see the advantages of buying ABC."); Zweig et al., supra note 46, at 124
(acquisition "leave[s] many media-industry observers scratching their heads over where the gains
are going to come from.").
81 See George J. Church, Just Three Easy Pieces: Running Against the Trend of American
Business, AT&T Announces the Biggest Corporate Split-Up Ever, Tiara, Oct. 2, 1995, at 38; Lohr,
supra note 46, at D1; Zweig et al., supra note 46, at 122.
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tion of Turner Broadcasting8 2 have all been criticized as non-value-en-
hancing deals.83
C. Divestitures
Once a firm's management has made an ill-advised acquisition, it
can, of course, divest the acquired business. The same incentives that
motivate managers to make value-decreasing acquisitions, however,
create a disinclination to divest unsuccessful acquisitions. 84 Divestiture
would, after all, reduce firm size or diversification. In addition, there
may be other disincentives. Michael Porter theorized that a manager
might avoid divesting an under-performing business because doing so
would be a blow to a manager's professional pride in his ability to run
the business. Porter also theorized that managers might avoid divest-
ing under-performing assets because doing so might threaten the man-
ager's career by signaling failure or by eliminating the need for the
manager's expertise. 86 Nonetheless, divestitures do occur.
When divestitures do occur, however, they sometimes take a form
that fails to advance shareholder interests. A divestiture can be struc-
tured in one of two ways: either a sell-off, in which a firm sells assets
for cash or other consideration; or a spin-off, in which the firm distrib-
utes a subsidiary conducting one or more businesses to its sharehold-
ers.87 Sell-offs appear to be less value-enhancing than spin-offs. Numer-
ous studies have found that spin-offs result in positive stock price
reactions.88 In contrast, the evidence on sell-offs is mixed. Where firms
82 See Zweig, supra note 46, at 128 (quotingJames Quella: 'Turner overpaid for much of what
he bought, and now Time Warner is paying a premium on top of that.").
sMichael Lubatkin and Peter Lane speculate that because current mergers are stock-
financed, it is less likely that managers will be disciplined for bad deals than in the case of
debt-financed deals. Lubatkin & Lane, supra note 77, at 21.
84 This Article focuses on managerial barriers to divestiture. Just as there are many explana-
tions for takeovers, however, there are many explanations of barriers to exit. See generally Irene
M. Duhaime & John H. Grant, Factors Influencing Divestment Dedsion-Making: Evidence from a
Field Study, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT.J. 301 (1984) (in large, diversified firms, the major determinants
in divestment decisions are unit strength, unit interdependency and firm financial strength
relative to industry averages); Kathryn Rudie Harrigan, Deterrents to Divestiture, 24 AcAD. MGsrr.
J. 306 (1981) (testing the influence of various economic and strategic exit barriers across different
industries); Michael E. Porter, Please Note Location of Nearest Exit: Exit Barriers and Planning 19
CAL. MGmT. REv. 21 (1976) [hereinafter Porter, Nearest Exit] (describing economic, strategic and
managerial exit barriers).
85 See Porter, Nearest Exi supra note 84, at 25, 26.
86 See id.
87 Spin-offs are tax-free to both the divesting corporation and its shareholders. See infra note
116 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., Gailen L. Hite &James E. Owers, Security Price Reactions Around Corporate Spin-Off
September 1998]
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
retain the proceeds of the sale, sell-offs tend to reduce firm value;
where firms pay out the proceeds to shareholders, sell-offs tend to
increase firm value.89
The occurrence of wealth-decreasing divestitures, like that of
wealth-decreasing acquisitions, may reflect managerial incentives.90 If
a firm sells off an asset and retains the sale proceeds, managers have
the opportunity to use the new free cash flow, possibly for another
inefficient investment. If, on the other hand, the firm pays out the sale
proceeds, free cash flow and the agency costs thereof are reducedy'
Similarly, spin-offs entail paying out assets to shareholders, thereby
precluding the possibility of wasteful investment by managers.9 2
In sum, financial economists have identified certain takeover-re-
lated transactions that tend to be value-increasing and others that tend
to be value-decreasing. The value-increasing transactions include bust-
up acquisitions, leveraged acquisitions, spin-offs and sell-offs in which
the proceeds are distributed to shareholders. Value-decreasing trans-
actions include stock-financed acquisitions and sell-offs in which sale
proceeds are retained. As the next Part will explain, the General Utilities
doctrine encouraged precisely those transactions that tend to be value-
Announcements, 12J. FmN. EcON. 409,434 (1983);James A. Miles &James D. Rosenfeld, TheEffect
of Voluntary Spin-off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth, 38 J. FIN. 1597 (1983); Katherine
Schipper & Abbie Smith, Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Voluntary
Spin-offs, 12J. FiN. EcoN. 437 (1983).
89 See Larry Lang et al., Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the Agency Costs of Managerial
Discretion, 37J. FiN. EcON. 3, 6-7 (1995) (positive stock price reaction significant only when asset
sale proceeds are paid out rather than retained); Myron B. Sloven et al., A Comparison of the
Information Conveyed by Equity Carve-Outs, Spin-Offs, and Asset SellOffs, 37J. FIN. EcoN. 89, 102
(1995) (same).
In addition, sell-offs that are part of an integrated strategic plan increase firm value, other
sell-offs decrease firm value. See Cynthia A. Montgomery et al., Divestiture, Market Value, and
Strategy, 27 ACAD. MGMT.J. 830, 838-39 (1984) (sales that are part of integrated, strategic plans
are associated with large positive stock market effects; routine, nonstrategic divestiturcs are
associated with negative stock price effects; those undertaken because of liquidity needs, govern-
ment pressure or unstated reasons exhibit no stock price effects).
9 0The literature on debt/equity agency costs offers an alternative explanation for empirical
observations. Managerial agency theory predicts managers will prefer sell-offs to spin-offs. In
contrast, debt/equity agency theory posits that shareholders will use spin-offs to expropriate
wealth from bondholders.
91 See Lang et al., supra note 89, at 6, 22 (sell-offs decrease shareholder wealth where firms
retain proceeds because expectation is that managers will waste proceeds); Sloven ct al., supra
note 89, at 93 (same).
92 See Sloven et al., supra note 89, at 93 (predicting less favorable stock effects for sell-offs
than spin-offs because agency problems are a factor in sell-offs but not in spin-offs, and because
spin-offs are subject to market monitoring while sell-offs are not). But see Scott C. Lin & Michael
S. Rozeff, The Effect of Voluntary Spin-Offs on Stock Prices: The Anerg Hypothesis, 1 FIN. PLAN. &
FORECASTING 265, 271-72, 281 (1985) (growth maximization hypothesis fails to explain, and is
inconsistent with, value-enhancing spin-offs).
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increasing and discouraged those that tend to be value-decreasing.
Conversely, the repeal of the doctrine discourages the former transac-
tions and encourages the latter.
III. THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE: EFFECTS AND EVALUATION
The General Utilities doctrine plays a complex role in takeovers, a
role that has not yet been fully explored in the existing literature. The
finance literature exploring the impact of tax laws on takeovers gener-
ally focuses on only one aspect of this role-the increased depreciation
deductions available to a new owner who elects basis step-up. 93 Tax
scholars offer a more comprehensive account of the effect of the
doctrine on takeovers, but fail to integrate their analysis with the
finance theories that explain takeovers and evaluate their social desir-
ability.9 4 This section attempts to bridge the discontinuity between tax
and finance analysis. It explores the various ways in which the General
Utilities doctrine affected takeovers, and evaluates these effects by ref-
erence to the framework developed in the previous Part.
A. Bust-Up Acquisitions
The General Utilities doctrine favored bust-up acquisitions which,
as discussed above, tend to be socially desirable. Accordingly, the doc-
trine's repeal eliminated this favorable treatment. Under the General
9
3In general, the finance literature on the effect of tax laws on takeovers focuses primarily
on three features of the tax law that, arguably, encourage takeovers: the deductibility of interest,
the transferability of corporate tax attributes such as net operating losses, and the ability of an
acquirer to step up the basis of a target corporation's assets without incurring the corporate level
tax. SeeAlanJ. Auerbach & David Reishus, The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions, in
MERGERS AND AcQuIsrrboNs 69 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988) [hereinafter Auerbach & Reishus,
Impact of Taxation] (effects of interest deduction, tax loss and credit transfers, and basis step-up);
Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, Taxes and the Merger Decision, in KNIGHTS, RAiDERs, AND
TARGrs: THE IMPACT OF THm HosTILE TAxEovER 300 (John C. Coffee,Jr. ed., 1988) [hereinafter
Auerbach & Reishus, Taxes and the MergerDecision) (same); RonaldJ. Gilson ct al., Taxation and
the Dynamics of Corporate Controk The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions, in KMiGHTs,
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: Tim IMPACT OF THE HosTniL TaxzovER 271 (John C. Coffee, Jr. ed.,
1988) (effects of interest deduction, basis step-up and tax loss transfers); Kaplan & Weisbach,
supra note 47 (effects of interest deduction and basis step-up). The third of these features-basis
step-up-implicates the General Utilities doctrine and affords two principal benefits to acquirers:
increased depreciation deductions and the ability to bust up the target corporation without
incurring any additional tax. However, the commentators focus only on the increased deprecia-
tion deductions afforded by basis step-up, and disregard the possibility that the target corporation
will be busted up. See Auerbach & Reishus, Impact of Taxation, supra, at 69; Auerbach & Reishus,
Taxes and the Merger Decision, supra, at 300; Ronald J. Gilson et al., supra, at 271; Kaplan &
Weisbach, supra note 47.
94 See, e.g., Coven, supra note 2; Stephan, supra note 2; Yin, supra note 22, at 1111.
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Utilities doctrine, an acquirer of the stock of a target corporation could
elect a tax-free step-up in the target corporation's assets under § 338,
thereby obtaining the ability to later divest target assets with no tax on
asset appreciation accruing prior to the acquisition.9 5 The prior owners
of corporations were not permitted to do this.96 Repeal of the doctrine,
therefore, has eliminated the ability of an acquirer to escape the
corporate level tax in a bust-up acquisition.
As discussed above, the bust-up acquisitions of the 1980s that the
General Utilities doctrine facilitated were probably socially valuable.
They "unwound" the inefficient acquisitions of the 1960s that incum-
bent managers-for reasons described above-were reluctant to un-
wind themselves. They also motivated managers to pay out excess cash
flows through leveraged share repurchases and other leveraged take-
over defense strategies. Furthermore, the threat of such takeovers
deterred managers from making additional inefficient acquisitions. By
enabling acquirers to bust up target corporations with no corporate
level tax, the General Utilities doctrine facilitated these value-enhancing
transactions. Thus, repeal of the doctrine may have a tendency to leave
intact inefficient acquisitions of the 1990s.
B. Stock-Financed Acquisitions Versus Cash-Financed Acquisitions
The General Utilities doctrine favored efficient, cash-financed ac-
quisitions-and conversely discouraged inefficient, stock-financed ac-
quisitions-by providing an acquirer with the benefits of stepped-up
basis in the target assets at the cost of only one tax, namely, to the
target shareholders. After General Utilities' repeal, obtaining the
benefits of a cash-financed acquisition now requires two levels of tax
to be recognized-tax to the corporation and tax to the sharehold-
ers-rather than the single, shareholder level tax that was imposed
under the doctrine.97 As a result, inefficient, stock-financed acquisitions
have become relatively more attractive, while efficient, cash-financed
acquisitions have become relatively less attractive.
98
95 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The stcp-up in target asset basis did not
trigger any corporate level tax; however, target shareholders, of course, incurred a tax on any
gain they recognized when they sold their shares for cash.
96 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
97 This discussion assumes that sale proceeds-whether from the sale of stock or assets, and
whether stock-financed or cash-financed-ultimately end up with the shareholders.
9sOther tax scholars have remarked upon this effect but have not explored its role in
exacerbating managerial tendencies to waste free cash flow. See Coven, supra note 2, at 149, 155;
Stephan, supra note 2, at 676; ZoIt, supra note 2, at 871-72. But see Shakow, supra note 26, at
180-88 (no strong empirical evidence exists that tax provisions affect form of acquisition).
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The decision to finance an acquisition with cash or stock depends
to some extent on competing tax considerations. On the one hand, a
stock-financed acquisition of a target corporation's stock or assets is
tax-free to both the target shareholders and the target corporation,
provided the acquisition qualifies as a tax-free reorganization. 99 A cash-
financed acquisition'00 of a target corporation's stock or assets is not
tax-free, and in this respect is less desirable than a stock-financed
acquisition. On the other hand, a cash-financed acquisition can pro-
vide the acquirer with a stepped-up basis in the target assets. Stock-
financed acquisitions provide the acquirer with a carryover basis in the
stock or assets it acquires. 01
Under the General Utilities doctrine, the benefits of a cash-
financed acquisition-stepped-up basis in target assets-could be ob-
tained at the cost of only one tax, imposed on the target shareholders.
The acquirer could accomplish this by purchasing target stock for cash
99A tax-free stock acquisition usually takes one of two forms. It can be structured as a "B"
reorganization, in which target shareholders "swap" their shares in exchange solely for voting
stock of the acquiring corporation. See I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (B) (1994). Alternatively, it can be
structured as a "reverse subsidiary merger," in which a target corporation merges with a subsidiary
of the acquiring corporation. Target corporation survives the merger and becomes a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. Target shareholders' shares are converted into
the right to receive acquiring corporation shares. In contrast to the "B" reorganization, target
shareholders in a reverse subsidiary merger may receive a limited amount of "boot," that is,
consideration other than stock of the acquiring corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 368(a) (2) (E)
(target shareholders must exchange controlling interest in target corporation for voting stock of
acquiring corporation); Brrr=x & EusTiCE, supra note 6, 14.12 at 14-32 to 14-33 (statutory
merger, or "A" reorganization, has no statutory limitation on amount of boot, but is subject to
judicial requirement that target shareholders have continuing proprietary interest in target
assets). Target shareholders must recognize gain, if any, to the extent of the boot they receive.
Seel.R.C. § 356 (1994).
A tax-free asset acquisition is usually structured as an "A" reorganization in which the target
merges into the acquiring corporation (a "forward merger") or a subsidiary of the acquiring
corporation (a "forward subsidiary merger"). See I.R.C. §§ 368(a) (1) (A), 368(a) (2) (D). The
acquiring entity survives the merger and becomes the owner of target assets. Target shares are
converted into the right to receive acquiring corporation shares. Alternatively, the asset acquisi-
tion can be structured as a "C" reorganization, in which the target corporation transfers its assets
in exchange for stock of the acquiring corporation and then liquidates, distributing the acquiring
corporation stock to its shareholders. See I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (C). All these forms of tax-free asset
acquisition permit target shareholders to receive some boot. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 368(a) (2) (B) (in
"C" reorganization, voting stock of acquiring corporation must be used to acquire at least 80%
of target assets; boot may be used to acquire remaining assets); Brrr.a & EUSTICE, supra note
6, 1 14.12 at 14-32 to 14-33 ("A" reorganization has no statutory limitation on amount of boot,
but is subject to judicial requirement that target shareholders have continuing proprietary
interest in target assets). Target shareholders must recognize gain, if any, to the extent of the
boot they receive. See I.R.C. § 356.
100 "Cash-financed acquisition" means a taxable acquisition for cash or any other considera-
tion.
101 See I.R.C. § 362 (1994).
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and making a § 338 election,10 2 or the acquirer could purchase target
assets, with the target corporation distributing the sale proceeds to its
shareholders in liquidation within twelve months.
103
General Utilities' repeal has imposed an additional tax cost-the
corporate level tax-on obtaining stepped-up asset basis in a cash
acquisition. Thus, although an acquirer of target stock can still make
a § 338 election to step up asset basis, the target corporation will
recognize gain. 1°4 Similarly, a cash-financed acquisition of a target's
assets is taxable to the target corporation even if the target corporation
then liquidates and distributes the sale proceeds to its shareholders. 10 5
This tax is in addition to the tax incurred by target shareholders upon
sale of their stock or receipt of a liquidating distribution. 106 General
Utilities' repeal has increased the attractiveness of stock-financed acqui-
sitions relative to cash-financed acquisitions. Cash-financed acquisi-
tions are more efficient than stock-financed acquisitions for several
reasons. First, efficient bust-up acquisitions tend to be cash-financed. 
107
Second, cash-financed acquisitions may be funded by debt incurred by
the borrower, and debt-financed acquisitions are more likely to be
efficient than stock-financed acquisitions.108 Finally, because stock-
financed acquisitions provide the acquirer with a carryover basis in
target assets or stock, managers contemplating disposition of ill-advised
acquisitions will face the prospect of a tax on pre-acquisition apprecia-
tion, thereby augmenting the non-tax barriers to divestiture described
above. 1°9 Repeal of the General Utilities doctrine has encouraged ine-
fficient, stock-financed acquisitions by eliminating the tax-favored
treatment of efficient, cash-financed acquisitions.
C. Divestitures
1. Historic Versus Stepped-Up Basis in Acquired Assets
The General Utilities doctrine favored transactions in which the
acquirer of a target corporation obtained a stepped-up basis in the
1o2 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
I-5 See I.R.C. § 337 (1982) (as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
100 Stat. 2085 (1986)) (no gain or loss recognized to corporation upon sale or exchange ofassets,
provided sale or exchange is pursuant to a plan of liquidation completed within 12 months).
104 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 10, 13 and accompanying text.
106SeeI.R.C. §§ 331, 1001 (1994).
10 7 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.1o9 See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
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target assets, thereby enabling managers who made ill-advised acquisi-
tions to subsequently divest them without paying tax on pre-acquisition
appreciation in the target assets. In contrast, repeal of the doctrine has
encouraged transactions in which the acquirer's basis in the target
assets equals the target's historic basis. A subsequent divestiture of
these assets thereby requires recognition of pre-acquisition apprecia-
tion, thus creating a tax barrier to divesting these assets. This barrier
augments the non-tax managerial barriers to divesting poor acquisi-
tions.
Under the General Utilities doctrine, an acquirer of a target corpo-
ration could elect to step up basis in the target's assets with no corpo-
rate level tax on the appreciation in those assets." 0 Without the doc-
trine, an acquirer wishing to obtain a stepped-up basis in target assets
must incur the corporate level tax. Repeal of the doctrine thus in-
creases the likelihood that an acquirer will choose not to step up basis
in the target's assets. Instead, the acquirer will choose to avoid the
corporate level tax, and to inherit historic basis in the target's assets."'
Any subsequent divestiture of the target assets will then result in rec-
ognition of historic, pre-acquisition appreciation as well as any post-ac-
quisition appreciation.
As discussed above, managers already have non-tax reasons for
failing to divest ill-advised acquisitions. The recognition of taxable gain
upon such a divestiture can be another significant barrier. By encour-
aging historic-basis acquisitions over stepped-up-basis acquisitions, re-
peal of the General Utilities doctrine increases the likelihood that tax
cost of divesting an acquisition will be a significant deterrent.
2. Sell-Offs
Under the General Utilities doctrine, a corporate sale of appreci-
ated assets-a sell-off-was taxable to the corporation, but a distribu-
tion of these assets to shareholders was not."2 This created an incentive
n 0Alternatively, an acquirer making a stock purchase could decline to make a § 338 election,
thereby acquiring a target corporation with historic basis in its assets. Assuming, however, that
the target assets were appreciated and that the target did not have tax attributes--such as net
operating losses-that the acquirer wished to preserve, the acquirer would most likely make the
election.
IIThe acquirer can avoid the corporate level tax-and inherit historic basis in the target's
assets-by purchasing the stock of the target corporation and forgoing the § 338 election.
Alternatively, the acquirer can acquire the target in a tax-free reorganization. See supra note 99
and accompanying text.
112 This discussion assumes that a distribution of appreciated property did not qualify as a
tax-free spin-off under § 355. Tax-free spin-offs are discussed in the next subsection.
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for corporations to divest assets by distributing them rather than by
selling them.13 A corporation wishing to sell an appreciated asset could
avoid the corporate level tax if it could successfully "disguise" the sale
as a distribution of the property to its shareholders followed by the
shareholders' sale of the asset.114 One necessary consequence of a
disguised sale was that the sale proceeds ended up in the shareholders'
hands.
The General Utilities doctrine favored corporate distributions of
appreciated property relative to corporate sales of appreciated prop-
erty, thereby encouraging efficient, size-reducing divestitures. Repeal
of the doctrine eliminated this favorable treatment.
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine has imposed a corpo-
rate level tax on the distribution of appreciated property to its share-
holders. As was the case under prior law, shareholders also recognize
income or gain with respect to their shares when either property or
cash is distributed to them.115 A distribution of appreciated property
currently results in two levels of tax. Similarly, a sale followed by
distribution of the sale proceeds likewise results in two levels of tax.
The only avoidable tax today is the shareholder level tax, which can
be avoided if the corporation sells assets and retains the sale proceeds.
The doctrine encouraged transactions that were equivalent in
result to efficient, size-reducing corporate sell-offs. In contrast, after
General Utilities' repeal, inefficient, size-maintaining sell-offs-those in
which managers retain the sale proceeds-are tax-advantaged. This
reinforces managerial incentives to retain sale proceeds and reinvest
free cash flows to the detriment of shareholders.
3. Spin-Offs
A spin-off is another means of divesting assets. In a spin-off, a
corporation distributes one or more of its businesses, held in subsidiary
form, to its shareholders. A spin-off is tax-free to both the corporation
and the shareholders." 6 Spin-offs have always been tax-advantaged
11SThe shareholders were taxed when they received the property distribution. Depending
on the circumstances and form of the distribution, shareholders might have dividend income (if,
for example, the distribution were a dividend or a pro rata redemption of stock and the
corporation had sufficient earnings and profits) or capital gain (if, for example, the distribution
was a non-pro-rata redemption of stock, or the corporation had insufficient earnings and profits).
See generally I.R.C. §§ 301, 302, 312 (1994). Thus, the incentive for corporations to avoid the
corporate level tax by distributing appreciated property rather than selling it was offset by the
tax to the shareholders.
114 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
"
5 See supra note 113.
116 The term "spin-off" is used loosely here to encompass the three types of divisive reorgani-
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relative to sell-offs. After General Utilities' repeal, spin-offs are even
more tax-advantaged because the corporate level tax is now imposed
on all types of sell-offs.
The implications are uncertain. On the one hand, as noted above,
spin-offs entail paying out assets to shareholders, thereby precluding
the possibility of wasteful investment by managers. In support of this,
many empirical studies find that spin-offs result in positive stock price
reactions. 1 7 On the other hand, firms may undertake spin-offs only
when they are desperate, i.e., when it is clear that they must get rid of
an under-performing business. Moreover, unlike a sell-off followed by
distribution, spin-offs retain the divested assets in corporate solution-
along with managers from the distributing firm-and therefore, the
same managerial problems persist, albeit split into two corporate enti-
ties. Furthermore, managers of the distributing firm may be using
spin-offs to further their own interests by reducing debt levels of the
distributing firm, which is one way to increase free cash flows and
reduce monitoring by creditors.
In summary, the General Utilities doctrine facilitated the transac-
tions that financial economists have identified to be value-increasing:
bust-up acquisitions, leveraged acquisitions and sell-offs in which sale
proceeds are distributed to shareholders. Repeal of the doctrine has
increased the relative attractiveness of value-decreasing transactions:
stock-financed acquisitions and sell-offs in which sale proceeds are
retained. The next Part argues that certain features of the General
Utilities doctrine ought to be reinstated.
zation under § 355: the pro rata distribution (the prototypical "spin-off"), the non-pro-rata
redemptive distribution (the prototypical "split-off") and the liquidating distribution (the proto-
typical "split-up"). In brief, a spin-off of a controlled subsidiary will qualify for tax-free treatment
both to the distributing corporation and to the distributee shareholders if the following require-
ments are met: (1) immediately after the spin-off, both the distributing corporation and the
distributed subsidiary are engaged in an active trade or business that has been carried on for at
least five years; (2) the spin-off is not principally a device to distribute earnings and profits of
either the distributing corporation or the distributed subsidiary (3) the distributing corporation
must distribute a controlling interest in the distributed subsidiary to shareholders; and (4) there
must be a business purpose for the spin-off. In addition, there are various statutory and judicial
holding period requirements, which are applicable to the distributing corporation, the distrib-
uted subsidiary and the distributee shareholders. For a detailed description of all the provisions
governing spin-offs, see GiNsBuRG ET AL., supra note 34, at 833-921.
117 See supra note 88.
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Revisiting the Arguments Supporting General Utilities' Repeal
As described in Part I, the General Utilities doctrine created ten-
sions that academics and lawmakers perceived to be undesirable. These
tensions ultimately led to the repeal of the doctrine. Parts II and III
argue, however, that the doctrine served useful purposes in constrain-
ing managerial self-interest. For example, the doctrine favored corpo-
rations that distributed assets to shareholders over corporations that
sold their assets to third parties and created-according to academics
and lawmakers-an irrational and arbitrary distinction between a dis-
tribution and sale." 8 The difference in the treatment of distributions
and sales, however, was neither irrational nor arbitrary. Rather, the
doctrine extended tax-favored treatment to efficient sell-offs (those in
which the divesting firm distributed either assets or sale proceeds
therefrom to its shareholders), while denying such treatment to sell-
offs that financial economists have found to be inefficient (those in
which the divesting firm retained the sale proceeds).
Similarly, both lawmakers and tax scholars believed the advantage
enjoyed by acquirers vis-d-vis historic owners was an undesirable non-
neutrality that contributed to a high level of takeover activity." 9 The
non-neutrality, however, was desirable in some respects. By favoring ac-
quirers, the General Utilities doctrine promoted efficient acquisitions-
cash- or debt-financed bust-up takeovers-and helped reverse past,
inefficient acquisitions. Meanwhile, the doctrine withheld this treat-
ment for inefficient, stock-financed acquisitions. Furthermore, the doc-
trine's advantageous treatment of new owners relative to historic own-
ers heightened the disciplinary effect of the takeover threat.
It is important, though admittedly speculative, to consider the
effect of the current corporate tax system on the ongoing merger wave.
As noted above, many of the current acquisitions are stock-financed,
tax-free acquisitions, and many of them are already showing signs of
trouble. Of course, many factors determine the level of takeover activity
and the structure and form of the deals. The current tax regime-by
weakening the threat of discipline for bad acquisitions and by encour-
aging free-cash-flow-enhancing, non-value-enhancing acquisitions and
divestitures-may be a significant contributing factor. Furthermore,
the current merger wave, like the 1960s wave, may require a "correct-
I18 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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ing" merger wave in the future. The current tax system, in contrast to
the tax rules in place during the corrective merger wave of the 1980s,
impedes rather than facilitates such a correcting merger wave. Rein-
stating the General Utilities doctrine would restore incentives for value-
enhancing takeovers and reduce the current biases toward value-de-
stroying takeovers. This reinstatement would help unwise acquisitions
to be "unwound" quickly and efficiently.
B. Reinstating the Doctrine
There are two potential bases for reinstating the General Utilities
doctrine. The first hinges upon the distinction between distributions
and sales of appreciated property. Both distributions and certain
sales-those in which the corporation distributes the sale proceeds to
its shareholders-tend to be efficient; sales in which the corporation
does not distribute the sale proceeds tend to be inefficient. Therefore,
it may be appropriate to tax inefficient divestitures differently from
efficient ones. Under this proposal, both non-liquidating and liquida-
ting distributions of appreciated assets would be tax-free to the distrib-
uting corporation. Similarly, both non-liquidating and liquidating sales
of appreciated assets would be tax-free to the distributing corporation,
provided that the selling corporation distributed the sale proceeds to
its shareholders.
The second basis for reinstating the doctrine focuses upon the
disparate treatment of new owners relative to historic owners, and of
cash- or debt-financed acquisitions relative to stock-financed acquisi-
tions. The proposal would essentially restore § 338 to its pre-1986 form.
Under this proposal, a purchaser of stock of a target corporation would
have the ability to elect under § 338 to step up the target's basis in its
assets with no gain recognition to the target. The proposal would
restore the tax-advantaged treatment of efficient acquisitions, i.e., bust-
up acquisitions and those financed with cash or debt rather than stock.
C. The Ideal Solution and Practical Considerations
This Article argues that the non-neutralities created by the General
Utilities doctrine were socially valuable because they offset managerial
tendencies to make and retain wasteful investments of free cash flow.
In so doing, it departs from traditional tax policy analysis which views
neutrality as one of the hallmarks of an ideal tax system. 2 0 Under the
120 B "ideal," I mean the system that most accurately measures income under the Haig-Si-
mons definition. Under this definition, income is the sum of personal consumption and accre-
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traditional view, the distortions that arise either with or without the
General Utilities doctrine are only one manifestation of two systemic
imperfections in our tax laws: (1) a classical, rather than integrated,
corporate tax121 and (2) the taxation of realized, rather than accrued,
gains and losses. 2 2 Rather than evaluating the relative merits of a world
with or without the General Utilities doctrine, traditionalists argue that
the only real solution is to adopt the ideal-a fully integrated corporate
tax system and accrual taxation. If this solution were adopted, then
the General Utilities doctrine would become irrelevant, because there
would be no corporate tax whatsoever and appreciated gains would be
taxed as they accrued rather than upon the occurrence of a realization
event.
tions to wealth over a specified time period. SeeRobert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Eco-
nomic and Legal Aspects, inTHE FEDERAL INcosmz TAx 7 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921), reprinted in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 59 (Richard
A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50
(1938); see, e.g., 1 T.REASURY DEPARTMENT, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND EcO-
NOmCC GRowTm 17 (1984); MICHAEL J. GRAETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 31-32 (3d ed. 1995).
A neutral tax system has traditionally been viewed as desirable because it does not interfere
with the ideal allocation of goods and services that would occur in a perfect market economy.
More recently, tax scholars have acknowledged that a neutral tax system is not necessarily
desirable because market imperfections and other government actions also affect the allocation
of resources. To the extent that our non-neutral tax system offsets these other distortions, a
neutral tax system would actually decrease social welfare. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956); Robert H. Scarborough, Risk,
Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 TAx L.
Rtv. 677, n.9 (1993); Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CI. L. REv.
1189, 1218-19 (1989); Zolt, supra note 2, at 842.
121 Our system adopts the classical model of corporate taxation, which imposes two levels of
tax on corporate income: first, on the corporation as earned and second, on the shareholders
upon distribution. Under an integrated corporate tax, corporate income would be taxed once,
at the shareholder level, rather than at both the corporate and shareholder level. See generally
A.L.I. FEDERAL INCOME TAx PROjECT, supra note 22; CHARLES E. MCCLURE,JR., MUST CORPORA'TE
INcoam BE TAXED INCE? (1979).
12 Our system taxes gains and losses upon the occurrence of a realization event, that is, upon
the sale of an asset or other disposition resulting in ownership of a materially differing asset. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1986). Under accrual taxation, gains and losses would
be taxed as they accrued-that is, as the value of assets increased or decreased within the taxable
period. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAx L. REv. 265 (1995); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986); Daniel N. Shaviro,
An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX
L. REv. 1 (1992); Theodore S. Sims, Long-Term Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and the Case for
Accrual Taxation, 47 TAx L. REv. 313 (1992);Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms
and Implementation, 99 YALE LJ. 1817 (1990); Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual
Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1982).
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Adoption of the ideal tax system, however, is not likely to occur
soon.123 Given that imperfections in our tax system are likely to persist,
we must make a pragmatic choice among imperfections. That choice
can be better informed by considering the interaction of tax non-neu-
tralities with other, non-tax non-neutralities.1 2 4 This Article argues that
the General Utilities doctrine helped to counteract undesirable mana-
gerial tendencies, while repeal of the doctrine has exacerbated these
managerial problems.
CONCLUSION
Tax scholars have always been ambivalent about the General Utili-
ties doctrine, despite its centrality to our corporate tax system. Al-
though both lawmakers and scholars welcomed its appeal in 1986, the
work of financial economists exploring the causes and consequences
of takeovers reveals that General Utilities' repeal may have had unin-
tended, undesirable consequences. Repeal of the doctrine has encour-
aged value-decreasing transactions in which managers are likely to
make or retain poor investments of free cash flow. In contrast, the
doctrine encouraged value-enhancing transactions in which managers
paid out free cash flows to shareholders or in which wasteful invest-
ments of free cash flow were reallocated more efficiently.
This Article evaluates the General Utilities doctrine within a frame-
work that is broader than the one traditionally used to evaluate tax
laws, one that incorporates managerial non-neutralities affecting take-
overs and divestitures. Viewed within this broader context, the non-
neutralities created by the General Utilities doctrine may have been
socially desirable. Thus, the doctrine ought to be reinstated.
123 SeeJennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE
LJ. 325, 329-31 (1995) (noting persistence of corporate tax despite widespread academic and
political support for integration); David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, - TAx
L. REv. _ (forthcoming) (likelihood of eliminating realization requirement remains remote
despite academic proposals for accrual taxation).
1241 am not making the more radical argument that, given a choice between a perfect and
an imperfect tax system, we ought to choose the imperfect system to offset the managerial biases
described in Part In. Of course, many tax law provisions intentionally depart from the ideal
arguably to correct perceived market imperfections. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(h) (1994) (capital gains
preference); I.R.C. § 103 (1994) (exclusion from gross income for interest on municipal bonds);
I.R.C. § 168 (1994) (accelerated depreciation); I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994) (exclusion from gross
income for contributions to employer-provided pension accounts).
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